

## MEHMET DEMİRAY **Senior Frontend Engineer at RedRose**



in mehmetdemiray




X demirayco

#### Awards & Recognitions



# **Spotlight on Frontend Security**

### Where Hackers Focus Their Efforts



13 %	Improper access control - generic
11%	Information disclosure
10 %	Cross-site scripting (XSS) - Reflected
7 %	Insecure direct object reference (IDOR)
5%	Privilege escalation
5%	Cross-site scripting (XSS) - stored
5%	Misconfiguration
3 %	Improper authentication - generic
3 %	Business logic errors
3 %	Cross-site scripting (XSS) - DOM



# The Hidden Part of the Iceber

The Prevalence of Unreported Vulnerabilities

# 40%

# 709 million

Number of blocked access attempts to phishing and scam sites



The widespread integration of technologies featuring built-in GPT chats has provided scammers with new avenues to exploit.

**Source:** Kaspersky reports phishing attacks grow by 40 percent in 2023

# Increase in phishing attacks 2023 - 2024



Dall-E Prompt: Create a Disney-style illustration with a white background explaining phishing.

## Bug Bounty Rewards and Accepted Reports from Leading Tech Companies

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	Total Paid	Total Report	
G	\$45,259,505	15237	<u>https://bughu</u>
$\mathbf{i}$	\$15,348,490	8500+	<u>https://bugbo</u>
	\$13,800,000	10000+	<u>https://www.</u>
X	\$1,593,219	1542+	<u>https://hacke</u>
Ú	\$20,000,000	?	<u>https://secu</u>
	\$4,791,150	1595+	<u>https://boun</u>

unters.google.com/about/key-stats
bounty.meta.com
<u>v.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/bounty</u>
<u>kerone.com/x</u>
<u>urity.apple.com/bounty/</u>
<u>inty.github.com/</u>

#### **Recommended Video Series**


https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL590L5WQ mH8dsxxz7ooJAgmijwOz0lh2H



### HACKING GOOGLE Series

#### Google

9 videos 1,220,540 views Last updated on Jan 6, 2023



Five elite security teams. Six never-before-told stories. Go behind the scenes with the hacking teams at Google keeping more people safe online than anyone else in the world.



## **Common Frontend Vulnerabilities**

**Security Issue types from Unsecured Frontend Code** 

1	XSS
2	NPM(DEPENDENCY) CONFUSING
3	OPEN REDIRECT
4	INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
5	INSUFFICIENT SESSION MANAGEMENT
6	BROKEN LINK HIJACKING
7	CSS INJECTION

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


### **Cross Site Scripting**

Total unique reports (all time)	90,871
Unique reports in last 12 weeks	2,529
12 week change	-23%

#### **IMPACTS**

Session Hijacking, Data Theft, Phishing Attacks, Keylogging ....more







#### **Potential Sources of XSS**

**User Input Forms** URLs Cookies **Third-Party Libraries HTTP Headers Data from External/Internal Sources Email and Messaging Systems WebSockets Event Handlers** Iframes and Embedded Contents **Browser Extensions** 


### **Prevent XSS attacks**

**Input Validation Output Encoding Content Security Policy (CSP) Escaping Data** Sanitize HTML **HTTPOnly Cookies Secure Headers Cross-Origin Resource Sharing(CORS)** 



#### Dall-E Prompt:

Create a Pixar-style illustration on a white background and colorful depicting a heroic character (resembling a Pixar protagonist) using a magical shield to protect a computer or website from malicious scripts, represented as dark, menacing lines of code. The character should display a confident and determined expression. Include security symbols like locks and checkmarks around the scene to emphasize protection and safety.



# NPM DEPENDENCY CONFUSING

A dependency confusion attack occurs when a dependency library is downloaded from a public registry rather than the intended private/internal registry because a malicious attacker could trick the package manager (npm for NodeJs, pip for Python, rubygems for ruby) into downloading the malicious one from the public repository he controls.


### **IMPACTS**


**Remote Code Execution** 

**Backdoor Injection** 

**Data Theft** 

+ more





# NPM DEPENDENCY CONFUSING

### **Real Example**


### **Dependency Confusion: How I** Hacked Into Apple, Microsoft and **Dozens of Other Companies**

The Story of a Novel Supply Chain Attack




Alex Birsan · Follow 11 min read · Feb 9, 2021

The code was meant for internal PayPal use, and, in its package.json file, appeared to contain a mix of public and private dependencies — public packages from npm, as well as non-public package names, most likely hosted internally by PayPal. These names did not exist on the public npm registry at the time.



S https://s3-media0.fl.yelpcdn.com × +	×
← → C 🔒 https://s3-media0.fl.yelpcdn.com/assets/public/module_biz_claim_pages_landing.yji-d31b8f13a3e9d210d83f.js 🔯 @ 🕁 👼 Incognito	:
( cest . yerp-js-inna cest	*
<pre>react","test:watch":"yelp-js-infra testreact</pre>	
-watchAll","prepublish":"make	
<pre>build","typecheck":"flow check"},"dependencies":</pre>	
{"snake-case":"^2.1.0","yelp-bunsen-logger-	
<pre>js":"^4.4.1","yelp_sitrep":"^7.13.2"},"devDependenci</pre>	
es":{"enzyme":"^3.11.0","flow-bin":"^0.100.0","flow-	
copy-source":"^1.2.1","react":"^16.4.2","react-	
dom":"^16.4.2"," <mark>yelp-js-infra</mark> ":"^33.39.0"},"files":	
<pre>["lib","src"],"peerDependencies":</pre>	
{"react":"^16.4.2","react-	
dom":"^16.4.2"}}')},20:function(e,t,n)	*
	•

			L	
Time	Organization	IP Address	Package Name	Hostname
RI AUG 21 2020 16:37:56 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.149.2	@idms/idms-pmrpc	.lan
RI AUG 21 2020 20:14:32 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	8faa3092cc97
RI AUG 21 2020 20:15:23 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	91c057281d0f
ON AUG 24 2020 17:40:43 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	1f3cc975c67b
ON AUG 24 2020 17:41:38 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.1	@idms/idms-pmrpc	fe01f79c7146
ON AUG 24 2020 17:46:06 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	7df2bb892313
ON AUG 24 2020 17:46:07 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.1	@idms/idms-pmrpc	c6269b74ec56
ON AUG 24 2020 19:55:16 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.1	@idms/idms-pmrpc	580f8f68bad3
ON AUG 24 2020 19:55:37 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	d7bea26b6122
UE AUG 25 2020 07:15:17 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	f507d7c91170
UE AUG 25 2020 07:16:00 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	e0b80fce2ded
UE AUG 25 2020 17:04:20 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	fab9b33c62b4
UE AUG 25 2020 17:21:45 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	dfec8557ad01
UE AUG 25 2020 17:22:24 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	23495738a747
UE AUG 25 2020 17:22:33 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	0b238c2f3792
UE AUG 25 2020 17:23:34 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	b9986c648086
UE AUG 25 2020 17:23:56 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	b44ff6b9bd5b
UE AUG 25 2020 17:24:01 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.1	@idms/idms-pmrpc	dbe40d2f0d7b
UE AUG 25 2020 17:35:18 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.1	@idms/idms-pmrpc	46ec329453e0
UE AUG 25 2020 17:35:26 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	493d6929fa02
UE AUG 25 2020 17:35:31 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.171.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	efdbc138d349
UE AUG 25 2020 17:35:42 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	c1f3c7e9dd7b
UE AUG 25 2020 17:56:39 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.151.1	@idms/idms-pmrpc	5-MacBook-Pro.local
UE AUG 25 2020 17:56:39 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.150.2	@idms/idms-pmrpc	s-MacBook-Pro.local
UE AUG 25 2020 19:12:59 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	ef4d6be2634f
UE AUG 25 2020 19:28:51 GMT	APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc.	17.122.	@idms/idms-pmrpc	74fb58c6b33f
HE AHC 35 3030 10.20.10 CMT	ADDI E_ENGTNEERTNG - Apple Toc	17 100	Aidme /idme_nmone	240202034262



## **Open Redirect** CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open **Redirect'**)

Total unique reports (all time)	13,486
Unique reports in last 12 weeks	392
12 week change	-13%

#### **IMPACTS**

**Phishing Attacks** XSS **Credential Theft Malware Distribution Session Hijacking Reputation Damage Information Disclosure** +more



### https://demiray.dev/login ?redirectUrl=https://demiray.dev/products

https://demiray.dev/login ?redirectUrl=https://dem1ray.com/login

https://demiray.dev/login ?redirectUrl=javascript:alert(1)


## **Information Disclosure**

### **CWE Discovery**

The Common Weakness Enumeration Discovery Index shows platform-wide data of instances, and severity and remediation time distributions. CWE data extracted every 24 hours.

Q sensitive information		
CWEID	Name	Number of reports
CWE-200	Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor	57,112
CWE-922	Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information	3,833
CWE-312	Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information	3,179
CWE-209	Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information	2,442
CWE-215	Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Debugging Code	1,975
CWE-319	Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information	1,925
CWE-538	Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File or Directory	858
CWE-201	Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data	485
CWE-532	Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File	94
CWE-540	Inclusion of Sensitive Information in Source Code	91






## Information Disclosure

#### Source code disclosure

```
export const getServerSideProps: GetServerSideProps
 ProfileLikesPageProps,
  { slug: string }
> = async ({ params }) => {
  // * NOTE: We cast `params` as we know it will never be `undefined` because this file is under [slug]
  // * (which catches the route w/o a parameter too).
  const profileHandle = (params as { slug: string }).slug;
  const [profile, createdTemplates] = await Promise.all([
  ]);
  if (!profile) {
    return { notFound: true };
  const likedTemplateIds = await getPublishedLikedTemplat
  let initialLikedTemplates: Template[] = []:
  const showExpertPage = p
  const numberOfInitialLikes = showExpertPage ? NUMBER_PER_PAGE_EXPERT : NUMBER_PER_PAGE_STANDARD;
    */
    const initialLikedTemplateIds = likedTemplateIds.slice(0, numberOfInitialLikes);
    const { templates } = await getTemplatesByIds(initialLikedTemplateIds);
    initialLikedTemplates = templates;
```



# **Information Disclosure**

### Sensitive Information into Log File Cross-domain Referer leakage

	<u>#252544</u>
3	Token leakage by referrer header & analytics
<b>3</b> 1	#237262 <b>T</b> Invitation tokens leak to Google Analytics
25	#1491127 آ
47	#196458 🕞 apps.shopify.com – CSRF token leakage through G



### **TOYOTA's Password reset token and Email Address leak via Referer** header



Jayson Vasquez Rubio · Follow 1 min read · Feb 28, 2019




#### y analytics site

**Google Analytics** 



## Insufficient Session Management

Total unique reports (all time)	1,810		No By
Unique reports in last 12 weeks	69	51	The the
12 week change	+57%		issu



#### lo Session Expiry after log-out, attacker can reuse the old cookies

y niraj1mahajan to Shopify Resolved

\$500.00 Low

disclosed 29 days ago

he session fixation vulnerability allowed an attacker to reuse old session cookies to log in to a victim's account on ne Exchange Marketplace, even after the victim had logged out. The service has been decommissioned, and the sue has been resolved. This summary was automatically generated.


#### Insufficient session expiration in the \*\*com.shopify.ping\*\* android app

By **fr4via** to **Shopify** 

Resolved

Low disclosed 3 years ago

Insufficient session expiration was identified in the com.shopify.ping android app, allowing the authentication token to remain valid even after the user logs out. This could allow an attacker to recover a fully functional session and access sensitive information. This summary was automatically generated.





## **Broken Link Hijacking**

milankatwal99 submitted a report to X (Formerly Twitter). Description

November 11, 2020, 6:59

A link in https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/twitter-api/tools-and-libraries was broken and anyone could create that account which leads to account impersonate

Steps To Reproduce

1) Visit https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/twitter-api/tools-and-libraries

2) Scroll down to Javascript/Node.js and click on by @HunterLarco (v2)

3) Create github username HunterLarcol

4) When someone visits and scroll down to javascript/Node.js and click on @HunterLarco (v2). They are redirected to my account

similar report https://hackerone.com/reports/265696

To solve this issue put this link https://github.com/HunterLarco

Please let me know if you have any questions. I am happy to help

#### Impact

Impact

The users are coming from developer.twitter.com So, the attacker can put malicious content on the github and many users will be the victim for example https://github.com/HunterLarcol/twitter-v2. Moreover it leads to the loss in the reputation of the company

4 attachments: F1073585: developer\_twitter.jpg

F1073586: account.jpg F1073587: profile1.jpg

F1073588: profile.jpg

**IMPACTS** Phishing Attacks **Malware Distribution Session Hijacking Reputation Damage Information Disclosure** +more



Dam UTC	Participants			SDKs / Libraries	Tools
	Reported to Report Id	X (Formerly Twitter)	Managed	SDKS / LIDraries	10015
	Disclosed Severity	February 4, 2021, 6:25a	am UTC	twitter-v2	twitte
	Weakness	Phishing		by @HunterLarco ( v2 )	by @s
	Bounty	None		twitter-lite	twitte
	CVE ID Account de	None		by @dandv and @peterpm	
					simpli @shal

https://github.com/join?ref\_cta=Sign+up&ref\_loc=header+logged+out&ref\_page=%2F&source=heade 110% ... ⊘ ☆

### Create your account

Username *	
HunterLarcol	~
Email address *	
testatifalam@gmail.com	~
Password *	
•••••	

Make sure it's at least 15 characters OR at least 8 characters including a number and a lowercase letter. Learn more.



### **CSS** Injection Frontend Sanitizing



### **Attack Scenerio**

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```
<a href="https://evil.com">
 <div class="card--add-project-menu reading--show-actions">
   <div class="drop-zone-indicator notice--red options-menu__action reading__actions">
     <strong class="project-header__name--overview todolist-group-form__fields u-full-height">
        Your session has expired. Please log in again.
     ~ STTOURS
    </div>
  </div>
</ a>
```

#### .card--add-project-menu .options-menu\_\_action { -webkit-transition: background 0.3s; -moz-transition: background 0.3s; -ms-transition: background 0.3s; transition: background 0.3s; -webkit-flex: 1; -moz-flex: 1; -ms-flex: 1; flex: 1; pointer-events: auto .drop-zone-indicator { position: fixed; top: 0; right: 0; left: 0; bottom: 0; border: 5px solid #2da562; z-index: 9; pointer-events: none


```
.notice--red {
   background-color: #ffe5e5;
   border-color: #ffc6c6
```


```
.camper-helper__hi {
   position: absolute;
   top: -2.5rem;
   left: 0;
   right: 0;
   font-size: 5rem
```

```
}
```



# **CSS Injection**







## **Thanks!**

### https://github.com/mehmetdemiray/JsKonf2024-HackMe